Wednesday, April 13, 2011

Responding to Farhat Taj — I

The Express Tribune

Responding to Farhat Taj — I

Published: April 10, 2011
The writer was a Ford Scholar at the Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at UIUC (1997) and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Studies Programme
Farhat Taj, a PhD Research Fellow at the University of Oslo, haswritten an article in Daily Times which takes up issue with what Iwrote in this space on March 13. Although she has chosen to cast aspersions on me by saying that I have "been providing misleading information about the Pakhtuns", which implies that I might be doing so at someone's behest, a calumnious and libellous statement, I will stick to the issues she has raised and avoid the low cut and thrust.
There are two sets of observations she makes. One set relates to the more abstract question of whether Pakhtun tribal society has undergone some changes, the second to a few specific incidents from the Orakzai and Kurram Agencies. There is a third set also, allegations against the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, which are easy to make but difficult to prove. They are generally made partially because we can rightly trace many of our current troubles to the military's policies, the original sin, and partly because army bashing, instead of offering issue-based criticism, is now the vogue and finds many buyers on all sides.
I intend, in this space, to pick up a few of her concrete observations and leave the rest to subsequent articles.
Firstly, Ms Taj is wrong in conflating my article with Brigadier Asad Munir's piece because I specifically took up issue with some observations made by the brigadier. Just because I concur with the brigadier on one point does not mean I endorse what he wrote by penning a sequel to his piece.
Ms Taj says I made some observations on the basis of my visit to Hangu 12 years ago. I quoted that visit because some things on that visit struck me as odd; it does not mean that I have stayed away from that area or Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas since then. Heavily invested in the region over many years, I have made several trips there. But I was not filling out a form listing the number of visits I have made to that area; I was making a point and mentioned that visit to do so.
Now to the issue of the Alikhel, Ferozekhel and Stoorykhel tribes in Orakzai, starting with the Alikhel. The tribe has five tappas or branches, out of which the panjam is half Shia and half Sunni. The Shia branch is called Babanamasi. Contrary to what Ms Taj says about the Alikhel Sunnis and Shias fighting the Taliban together, the Shia branch left the area before the conflict with the Taliban began in the Agency. This fact can be corroborated from the IDP camps in Kohat. Some of them returned to their homes after the political agent held a jirga and issued a warning to the Taliban through the Alikhel lashkar led by a former JCO, Subedar Momin Khan.
The other four tappas allied to resist the Taliban. The army was stretched, military operations were not popular, this being before the public buy-in came and resulted in Operation Rah-e-Raast in Malakand and Frontier Corps' Operation Black Thunder in Lower Dir and Buner. The operations that had been conducted in South and North Waziristan were weak in the higher direction of this war and generally consisted of extraction operations and snap actions.
(NB: Trouble had been brewing in the agency for quite sometime, the provincial governor from May 2006-January 2008 was Lt-Gen Ali Jan Orakzai (retd). He belonged to the area, and became known for opposing military operations against the Taliban, a stand generally popular with both the right and the left wings.)
Alikhel resisted until their jirga was attacked by a suicide bomber. The attack killed Momin Khan along with more than 100 others, while over 300 tribesmen were injured. Interestingly, not one Shia was killed in this attack, which would not have been possible if the Shia branch were part of the anti-Taliban lashkar. This was the Taliban warning to the Sunni Alikhel for raising a lashkar against them, a campaign which was duly supported by the then political administration of the Agency.
Momin Khan was awarded Sitara-e-Shujaat posthumously. The dead were given Rs300,000 in compensation while the injured got Rs100,000.
The story of the Ferozkhel tribe is even more interesting. They raised a lashkar and their initial campaigns against the Taliban were very successful. Ms Taj mentions that the Ferozkhel captured six Taliban who were handed over to the political administration, which released them after a week. This is amazing disinformation. The Ferozkhel, in fact, captured 14 Taliban (I can give to Ms Taj the names, domiciles and other information on these people) from the Gwin checkpoint in central Orakzai. After this, the lashkar also cleared the Chhapri Ferozkhel area bordering Bara in Khyber Agency. The pressure got the Taliban to start negotiating with the Ferozkhel. They gave the Ferozkhel guarantees that they would not operate in the area and, as a goodwill gesture, the Ferozkhel should release the captured men.
Four Maliks of Ferozkhel, Adil Khan Ferozkhel, Sardar Ferozkhel, Abdur Raheem and Bismillah Ferozkhel allowed the release of these men. Three of these four have since been killed. Bismillah was killed on Oblan Road that goes from Hangu to Kohat; Adil Khan killed in Meerobak; and Abdur Raheem recently killed in Peshawar.
But before this, and after the release of their men, the Taliban attacked and killed seven Ferozkhel Maliks in an ambush, sending a warning to the tribe to stay clear of them and not interfere with their campaign against the government.
The Stoorikhel also raised a lashkar. The tribe has one branch which is Sunni and one that is Shia. The government supporting the effort asked the Shia branch to leave the area to avoid the Taliban painting this in sectarian terms. The Sunni Stoorikhel gathered under the banner of Malik Waris Khan and fought the Taliban for 10 days or so before being defeated. Waris Khan was killed, as were personnel of Levies. Sepoy Qismat Khan was awarded the Sitara-e-Shujaat and Rs800,000 posthumously, while Waris Khan was given the Tamgha-e Imtiaz.
The compensations and awards would not have come if the tribes were fighting the Taliban against the wishes of the government and the security forces. What I have narrated here is a bird's-eye view of complex details. There is a sectarian dimension in the area that goes back into deep past and to which is now added the Taliban factor. There's more to it which I shall try and touch upon in the follow up to this.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 11th,  2011.

Responding to Farhat Taj — II

The Express Tribune

Responding to Farhat Taj — II

Published: April 11, 2011
The writer was a Ford Scholar at the Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at UIUC (1997) and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Studies Programme
In a March 13 article in this newspaper, I wrote that Pakhtun society has been undergoing changes. Intertribal support along sectarian lines, as well as the activities of Punjabi extremists in Pakhtun heartland, bear testimony to that. Ms Taj says the mullah does not enjoy primacy in the tribal hierarchy. That is only partially true; Maulvi Abdullah in Orakzai, who died last year, was the leading sectarian troublemaker in collusion with Javed Ibrahim Piracha.
But more than the mullah, it is the young self-styled Taliban commanders who have done much to change the norms of Pakhtun society. For strategic and operational reasons they have indulged in acts that, despite feuds among Pakhtuns, were revered. Attacks on jirgas, funerals and shrines are a manifestation of this change. Indeed, because Ms Taj is writing a book, I strongly recommend that she read Patrick Porter's Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes to understand the significance of this phenomenon.
The same phenomenon is at work in Kurram, which I just visited and where I spoke not only with the Commandant of Kurram Militia (it is not Kurram Scouts, as Ms Taj mentions in her despatch) Colonel Tauseef Akhtar, but also former Senator Syed Sajjad Hussain and Sunni leader from Sadda, Haji Saleem. Far from acting against Shia interests, as alleged by Ms Taj, Colonel Akhtar, in trying to clear the area and the road, as part of Operation Khwakh Bade Sham, got shot himself (his right leg will never fully recover). The Frontier Corps (FC) and army have lost 80 personnel, including 10 officers, which is a very high officer-to-jawan casualty ratio.
Sajjad Hussain and many other common people who I met and talked to in Parachinar explained that trouble began from Mira Jan Colony after Sunnis supported by sectarian elements held rallies and made provocative speeches. A few Sunni villages were attacked and properties looted and burnt. These people had to leave the area. This sparked trouble down south in Sadda. Sunnis were also supported by Taliban elements, a fact accepted by Haji Saleem, though he said that this is more out of fear than conviction. The Sunnis closed down the road.
Colonel Akhtar has held three peace jirgas. When I pointedly asked him why he had invited Javed Ibrahim Piracha, he said that it was an effort to get everyone on board but that after the first meeting when some Shia leaders objected to Piracha's presence, he was not invited to the other two meetings. To corroborate this, he gave me videotapes of the jirgas held. I then independently asked Haji Saleem and he confirmed this fact. I still have to speak with MNA Munir Orakzai on this issue.
I have raced through this narrative again for reasons of space and eschewed many details. But it should be an amazing fact that Colonel Akhtar, supposed to be supporting Sunnis against Shias, as also his officers and men, should get injured and die in battles against Sunnis!
Equally absurd is the contention that ISI is playing a game which is not only getting civilians killed but also, empirically speaking, army and FC officers and men. The current Corps Commander Peshawar served in the ISI as DG of one of the wings. Going by Ms Taj's argument, then major-general, now Lt-General Asif Yasin Malik, pursued policies while in the ISI which got men in the field killed but now, having become the Corps Commander, would be interested that the operations succeed because he is no more in the ISI!
The Murree Accord had several points, most important being the return of Sunnis and Shias to their respective villages. In the March 2011, meeting of leaders from the area with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, the order of the points was reversed, making road opening a priority. Sunnis say they want agreement on other points before the road can be opened. MNA Orakzai has got a Rs1.7 billion package from the prime minister for rehabilitation and development. People in the area told me they think disbursements should begin shortly. My own sense is that while this money is important, it would also be necessary to clear central Kurram of Taliban elements through another operation. It is important for security forces to control the physical space to keep the road secure and open.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 12th, 2011.

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

High fares ground flights to Kurram

High fares ground flights to Kurram

By Zulfiqar Ali | From the Newspaper




PESHAWAR, April 10: The political administration of Kurram Agency has ordered a private aviation company to stop its chartered aircraft service to Parachinar following complaints by local people that the company charges exorbitant fares from them.

The elders of the volatile area complained that the Lahore-based Hybrid Aviation charged Rs18,000 to Rs20,000 one-way fare from each passenger between Peshawar and Parachinar, the administrative headquarters of Kurram Agency.
An official said that after verification of the complaints, the authorities directed the management of the company in Parachinar on Saturday to stop flight operations. He said that the company agents were charging excessive fares, which angered local people.
The people have stopped travelling by road after militants attacked four passenger coaches on Thall-Parachinar Highway in Baggun, lower Kurram on March 26. Three persons were killed and two others wounded in the broad daylight attack while 35 passengers were kidnapped.
The elders of the area have decided that local people would not use Thall-Parachinar Road unless government released 35 kidnapped persons from their captors and made foolproof security arrangements to prevent such attacks in the future.
Local people have been virtually stranded after the attacks. They can neither take detour via Kabul owing to blockade of border with Afghanistan nor travel through main road due to insecurity. The prevailing situation has forced them to meet tough 'demands' of the aviation company's agents.
The chartered flight service between Peshawar and Parachinar was started in 2009 owing to blockade of the main road and insecurity in the area. Initially government had authorised four aviation companies to operate chartered flights for the besieged valley.
The road was opened in February this year after implementation of a peace agreement and two aviation companies stopped flights while Peshawar Flying Club, a semi-government organisation, and Hybrid Aviation, a private company, continued the service.
An official of Civil Aviation Authority told this correspondent that the companies, except Flying Club, didn't have prescribed booking offices and had hired mobile local agents to facilitate passengers. The Flying Club is using its own facility for loading and off loading of passengers while other companies use the CAA premises at Peshawar International Airport.
"The CAA will take action if passengers lodge complaint regarding fare, flight safety and other facilities. But we have yet to receive any complaint," the official said. The Flying Club, which operates four-seat light aircraft, charges Rs8,500 one-way fare per passenger. The travel agents of Hybrid Aviation receive minimum Rs18,000 one-way fare from each passenger.
Sources said that a passenger in Parachinar, who was going to Middle East, had paid Rs40,000 to get a seat on the flight to Peshawar to catch his connecting flight.
Hybrid Aviation manager flights Mohsin Syed, when contacted, said that the company sold airtime and charged Rs90,000 per hour. He said that the company had fixed Rs9,700 fare per passenger. He neither denied nor confirmed reports about high fares being charged by the company's booking agents.
If passengers made booking in advance then they would get ticket on the prescribed rate, he said, adding media should investigate why other aviation companies did not operate flights for Parachinar.
The people of Kurram tribal region have been facing with numerous problems for the last couple of years owing to sectarian clashes and insecurity on Thall-Parachinar Road. Increase in prices of daily use items owing to blocked of road has also added to their miseries and financial woes. The recent attacks on passenger coaches on Thall-Parachinar Road have also put a question mark on the sustainability of the peace agreement.
 

Three killed, 13 injured in Kurram Agency blast

 Tuesday, April 12, 2011
 



PARACHINAR: Three persons were killed and 13 others sustained injuries when a passenger van hit an improvised explosive device (IED) in Kannaki village in upper part of Kurram Agency early Monday, official and tribal sources said. 

The sources said that the van was carrying passengers to Parachinar from Kannaki when it hit an IED planted by the militants. The sources said three persons, including the driver of the vehicle Mohammad Hassan, Noor Wali and Maulana Rehmat Ali, were killed on the spot. Thirteen other passengers, including women and children, sustained injuries. Villagers reached the spot and shifted the injured persons to the Agency Headquarters Hospital, Parachinar. 

The injured included Yousaf Ali, Munsib Ali and his wife and two children, Arab Ali, Rehmat Ali, Mir Mohammad, Sharbat Ali, Momin Ali, Tajir Hussain, Nabi Hussain and Gul Wazir. Doctors at the hospital said that two of the injured were in a critical condition. 

Local residents have expressed concern over the increasing incidents of roadside blasts in Kurram Agency. They appealed to the government to deploy security forces on the road to save innocent people from being killed.
 

25 displaced families say goodbye to Jalozai camp



Tuesday, April 12, 2011
NOWSHERA: Convoy of eight vehicles comprising 25 internally displaced families from Mohmand Agency on Monday said goodbye to Jalozai settlement established for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) who had been uprooted from their native villages and towns because of violence. 

Following the decision of the government, the UNHCR and the relevant line departments, the IDPs were earlier intimated about return to their places of origin as peace was restored there. The returning IDPs were provided free transport by the Fata Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) to reach their hometowns and villages. 

On the first day of the return process, two dozens families displaced from Mohmand Agency left for their areas while the repatriation would continue till all the IDPs from Mohmand and Bajaur agencies were sent back to their homes.

The camp officials said all facilities including overall protection to the affected people by the relief organisations and the government would be provided to them in their places of origin.While the government has chalked out programme for the repatriation of the displaced people, the IDPs from Bajaur Agency were not willing to leave Jalozai camp as they had communicated their reservations to the camp officials. They said the government must first compensate them for the losses of their destroyed homes. They said their homes were destroyed in the military action that was carried out in Bajaur Agency to flush out militants.

On the other hand, the camp officials said the returning IDPs could take the tents provided in the camp along with them, as the government would compensate them once surveys were completed and losses properly documented.

Camp in-charge Abdul Akbar said that the government and the relief organisations would provide every facility to the IDPs in their native areas as IDPs status inside the Jalozai camp had been withdrawn. 

Meanwhile, the IDPs from Bajaur Agency would hold a consultative meeting today (Tuesday) at the camp to decide about their return, sources said. The return of IDPs from the humanitarian perspective is a voluntary process as governments around the world normally could not force or coerce vulnerable communities till complete protection is ensured in their places of origin, expert said. 

Statistical data suggested that more than 15,000 families uprooted from Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber agencies are living in Jalozai camp. Besides Jalozai camp, a big portion of displaced people from Mohmand, Bajaur, Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber Agency were still living in host communities and rented houses in Mardan, Swabi, Charsadda, Nowshera and Peshawar districts in particular, sources said. 

Sources said the IDPs living in host communities and rented houses, particularly in Peshawar district where they are concentrated on Kohat Road, Dilazak Road, Tehkal, Tajabad, Bakhsho Pul, Yakkatoot, Inqilab Road, Garhi Atta Muhammad and Badaber, were the most vulnerable communities. 

Most of these families even included unregistered ones as they were displaced later because of violence in upper tehsil of Kurram Agency (Shalozan-Tangi) and were confronted with non-release of food ration or non-registration for World Food Programme free food facility, access to education and healthcare and unemployment, sources said. 
 

Sunday, April 10, 2011

Kurram Agency and the U.S. and Pakistan's Divergent Interests


Kurram Agency and the U.S. and Pakistan's Divergent Interests
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November 2, 2010 | 1214 GMT

Kurram Agency and the U.S. and Pakistan's Divergent Interests
Pakistani soldiers patrol in northwestern Kurram tribal district close to the Afghan border on July 6, 2010
Summary
Two of prominent militant leader Jalauddin Haqqani's sons have been meeting with tribal elders from Kurram agency in Peshawar and Islamabad in a bid to end Sunni-Shiite violence in northwestern Pakistan's Kurram agency. Many outside parties have an interest in what happens in the strategic region, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, Islamabad and Washington. While having the Haqqanis negotiate a settlement may be a boon to Islamabad and the Afghan Taliban, it will create challenges for the Pakistani Taliban and Washington.
Analysis
Media reports have emerged that two of important Taliban leader Jalauddin Haqqani's sons, Khalil and Ibrahim, are involved in peace talks in Pakistan's tribal belt between Sunni and Shiite leaders from Kurram agency. The talks, which have been held in Peshawar and Islamabad, represent an attempt to settle the long-running sectarian dispute in Kurram agency.
This dispute has expanded beyond localized sectarian violence into one with much further-reaching consequences involving the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. The implications of the wider struggle encapsulate divergent U.S. and Pakistani interests in the wider region.

A Strategic Area

Kurram agency is one of seven districts in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). With an area of 3,380 square kilometers (about 1,300 square miles), it is the third-largest agency of the FATA after South and North Waziristan. The only area in the tribal badlands with a significant Shiite population, Kurram has a long history of sectarian violence predating the creation of Pakistan in 1947.
The area became the main staging ground for joint U.S.-Saudi-Pakistani intelligence aid for the multinational force of Islamist insurgents battling Soviet forces and the pro-Moscow regime in Kabul during the 1980s, during which time Kurram's capital, Parachinar, frequently came under attack by Soviet and Afghan aircraft. The influx of predominantly Sunni Afghan and other Islamist fighters altered the sectarian demographic balance to some extent. The Shia bitterly resisted, but Islamabad's support of Sunni locals overcame their efforts.
Kurram saw its most intense sectarian clashes only after the rise of the Pakistani Taliban phenomenon in 2006-07, however. The agency saw two weeks of violence in April 2007 as sectarian attacks spiraled out of control after a gunman opened fire on a Shiite procession in Parachinar. The violence spread all the way southeast to Sadda before the Pakistani military went in to restore order. Despite a peace agreement between the two sides that officially ended the conflict in October 2008, antagonism between the communities continued to simmer. Violence comes mostly in the form of tit-for-tat small-arms attacks carried out by tribal militias on their Sunni or Shiite neighbors.
Tribal and geographic differences reinforce the sectarian conflict. The Shia break down into three major tribes, the Turi, Bangash and Hazara. Meanwhile, eight major Sunni tribes populate most of central and lower Kurram. Sunni and Shia live in close proximity to each other throughout Kurram, which has a population of around 500,000 consisting of roughly 58 percent Sunni and 42 percent Shia.
The Sunnis' main advantage lies in control of lower Kurram. They have exploited this to close off the only major road from Parachinar, which lies on the edge of the mountains of Upper Kurram, to Thal in lower Kurram — where connections to larger markets of Peshawar and Karachi can be made. Without access to this highway, supplies have become scarce in upper Kurram.
The Shia's main advantage is control of a strategic piece of high ground that forms a peninsula of Pakistani territory jutting into Afghanistan, territory that has shifted over the centuries between Mughal, Afghan, British and Pakistani control. Upper Kurram provides powers from the east easy access to Kabul, which lies just under 100 kilometers (about 60 miles) from the border between Kurram agency and Paktia province, Afghanistan. This geographic advantage is why the CIA and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate decided on it as the location for training and deploying Mujahideen fighters into Afghanistan to fight the Soviets during the 1980s. It is thus key territory for anyone who wants access into eastern Afghanistan — Islamabad and the Taliban included.
The sectarian violence simmering in Kurram complicates Islamabad's efforts to defeat the Pakistani Taliban while maintaining ties with the Afghan Taliban. The violence has become a more serious threat to Islamabad's efforts in recent years, as outside forces reportedly have begun to exploit the sectarian violence. Sunni leaders in Kurram have blamed Iran for supplying weapons and cash to their Shiite rivals. While there is little evidence to back up this claim, it would make sense that Iran would want to establish a bridgehead in the Shiite population allowing it to operate in eastern Afghanistan.

The Sunni Militant Landscape in Kurram and the Afghan Angle

Well-known Pakistani jihadist Baitullah Mehsud used the base of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Orakzai to expand TTP influence in Kurram. Following Baitullah's death, Mullah Toofan (aka Maulana Noor Jamal) emerged as the main TTP leader in the central rim of the FATA. Mullah Toofan now leads efforts targeting Kurram from Orakzai, which has become the main TTP hub since the Pakistani army evicted the group from South Waziristan in a late 2009-early 2010 ground offensive. Many militants subsequently resettled in Kurram.
The TTP formed alliances with the Sunni tribes in Kurram in its bid to establish a sanctuary there. The TTP later began using the sanctuary provided by allied Sunni tribes in Kurram in coordination with Orakzai and South Waziristan to conduct attacks in the core of Pakistan.
For their part, the Haqqanis want a more stable environment in Kurram. Kurram is a key piece of territory for the Haqqani network, which organizes and has sanctuaries in Pakistan's northwest from which it engages U.S., NATO and Afghan government military forces in eastern Afghanistan as part of the Afghan Taliban's eastern front.
Islamabad is very open to cooperation with the Haqqanis. They pose no direct threat to Islamabad but have the military and political clout to shape conditions on the ground in northwestern Pakistan — to say nothing of Afghanistan, where Pakistan is trying to rebuild its influence. The Haqqanis are best positioned to convince Sunnis in lower Kurram to open up the road to Parachinar and to restrain Shiite forces from attacking Sunnis (and vice versa). The easing of sectarian tensions, likely if this happens, would hamper the TTP's ability to grow in Kurram, satisfying Islamabad's goal in the agency.
If the Haqqanis can successfully negotiate a peace in Kurram (or at least a cease-fire — Kurram's geopolitical and sectarian rivalries will not simply vanish) it would give them a stronger foothold in an area close to Kabul and eastern Afghanistan. This arrangement would not bode well for security in eastern Afghanistan, where U.S. and coalition forces are concentrating much of their efforts in their current offensive against the Taliban and al Qaeda.
This would come at a bad time for Washington, which is looking to contain the Afghan Taliban as it seeks to bolster the U.S. negotiating position ahead of eventual talks regarding a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The Kurram sectarian conflict is also the most prominent example of Islamabad trying to eliminate "bad" Taliban while supporting "good" Taliban. Preventing sectarian violence in Kurram from spiraling out of control and benefiting the TTP requires that Islamabad seek the services of the Haqqanis. This also will help Pakistan's longer-term efforts to re-establish its influence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces. Kurram thus encapsulates the larger challenges Washington faces in containing a militant movement that enjoys Islamabad's tacit support.